GIVE THE 53RD A FAIR GO, MATE

For overseas friends who have little knowledge of Australians in

1942 fighting in New Guinea against the Japanese, we point out

that two Australian militia battalions were sent up the Kokoda track.

The past historian of the 2/14^th Association advises that the 39^th

Battalion was sent to give defensive support to the Americans digging

the Dobadura air strip complex. But they turned back towards Kokoda

with the landing of the Japanese on the north coast.

The 53^rd was still in Port Moresby at this point and moved up the track
aware that the Japanese were landed and on the move.  Both the 39^th

and 53^rd militia battalions were not prepared for combat.

Soldiers of both battalions had little arms skill, having spent their time in

Port Moresby digging defensive positions and loading ships. Bill Mahney

of the 39^th Battalion stated that he was unloading the Macdui when it was

bombed in Simpson Harbour.

The 39^th arrived at Isurava with the knowledge that their Commander Lt

Col W. Owen was killed at Kokoda. He was replaced by Major A.G.

Cameron who had evacuated from Rabaul. He was to be replaced by Lt

Col Ralph Honner who arrived on 16 August. The 53^rd moved into Alola

on the same day. Honner undoubtedly moved up the track with them.

Let us review recorded statements on the 53^rd from Dudley Mccarthy.

The excerpts from his book are in the report below.

P141. The same day that Rowell assumed command, Brigadier Porter

was ordered to move across the track to take command of Maroubra

Force to which a second of his battalions the 53^rd had been allotted.

The first company of that Battalion had left Ilolo on the 11^th, another

was starting from Ilolo on the 12^th and the whole unit was expected

to arrive by the 20^th.

B Company of the 53^rd marched into Alola on the same day and C

company was only one days march behind. Honner knowing Porter

was on his way, decided to keep the 53^rd intact for him to employ

as he would and use the 39^th to keep in touch with the Japanese.

He left the 53^rd companies at Alola with the Papuans to patrol the

tracks east and west of the main Kokoda Track. converging on

Alola from Missima and Naro.

P.196. Headquarters of the 7^th Division had been established at

Port Moresby on the 18^th and Potts informed them of supply

difficulties.He took over command of Maroubra Force on the

23^rd.

P.199. Maladministration of supply undermined Potts’ position

even before he met his enemies and had the effect of cabining and

confining all his activities in the forward areas. It changed his role

from an offensive to a defensive one. It denied him the use of the

2/27^th at a crucial time.

Potts considered three plans – leave the 53^rd and 39^th at Alola and

Isurava and the 2.14^th and 2/16^th at Myola until supply was assured. 

To relieve worn out 39^th with an AIF battalion, leave the fresh 53^rd

in position, leave both militia battalions in position and deploy the

2/14^th and 2/16^th on high ground to east and west. This he rejected

the plan so as not to expose the exhausted 39^th. He adopted the

second with the untried 53^rd as a pivot.

He planned to use the untried 53^rd as a pivot. Yet in a couple of days,  

we read below that he was advising Allen that the 53^rd was so badly

organized as to be unable to fight. Planning on the run. Perhaps his

second option would have been more effective. If the 53^rd was to be

left in position, was this at Alola?

Brigadier Potts had signaled Allen that he could not extricate the 39^th

from the forward areas without leaving 2/14^th dangerously alone.

From all this we conclude that the Brigade HQ with Brigadier Porter

moved up the track with the 53^rd. The whole 53^rd battalion arrived by

20 August or later which meant that they had just over a week to prepare

for the Japanese onslaught. This also meant training in combat drills for

which they were not trained.

Honner decided to keep the 39^th in touch with the Japanese and to employ

the 53^rd as he saw fit. He undoubtedly used them to prepare the defensive

positions for the Brigade HQ at Alola. If Honner made such a decision, he

would have been the acting Brigade commander until the arrival of Brigadier

Porter.

He had the 53^rd patrolling. At the same time, the 39th was preparing the

defensive positions at Isurava. So the 53^rd was based at Alola. According

to the 2./14 Association past historian, the 53rd were required to move

down to the Abuari side company by company. And many were untrained

to use the rifles they held.

We can conclude the Brigade HQ arrived at Alola on or after 23 August

and moved into defensive positions constructed by the advance company

and the 53^rd.

We should compare the 39^th and 53^rd battalions. Firstly, the 39^th had an

experienced AIF officer as their CO. The 53^rd had an inexperienced militia

CO who was killed on the Abuari side.

The 53^rd had a most unsatisfactory move from Australia. Large numbers
of soldiers had not come back from Christmas leave and a new intake was

gained through what some called being shanghaied.

They did not farewell their families before they left. Perhaps the CO did not

want any more to desert. They certainly did not expect to be shipped to Port

Moresby and thence up the Kokoda Track., They were knowingly sent up

untrained for combat. We read of riots, drunkenness and fighting in Port

Moresby. Were there 53^rd soldiers involved?

The key role of the 39^th was to face the Japanese in defensive positions.
The 53^rd had a key role of patrolling which meant they were in the open
and subject to Japanese attacks.

We read that the 53^rd officers spent their time standing around. If at Alola,

they would be waiting to take their companies down the Abuari side. How

could they have an overall plan if deploying company by company.They

were not just badly organized. They were badly deployed.

The casualties of the 39^th were higher than those of the 53^rd. That means

that the 39^th was in more direct contact with the Japanese on the track up

from Deniki. It also means that the 53^rd had fewer contacts with the

Japanese on the Abuari side.

P199. The previous day, he had told Allen that the 53^rd was so badly

organized that they could not be relied on to fight. He repeated his request

 for the 2/27^th and said he would return the 39^th to Myola the next day.

He stressed the need to send the 39^th back to Myola as soon as possible

to ease the supply problem.

There seems to be a herd instinct bent on blaming the 53^rd. It may be

that furphies have abounded to show that the 53^rd was not capable of

fighting. It seems comments have been made and accepted that show

the worst.

We are told that when there was distribution of AIF officers, the CO

39^th chose more than the CO 53^rd. Did the Brigade Commander not

have input? Surely the AIF officers were deployed from Divisional HQ.

Perhaps the 53^rd had already been written off as a fighting force.

Peter Brune points out that in the withdrawal from Isurava, there was a

rear guard action at the Isurava rest house. The company of 53^rd just

came and camped at the guest house.

Yet Bill James shows the company firmly emplaced in the defensive line

with AIF companies. See his battle map. It seems more likely that they

camped and waited until further orders. They would not have to wait

long. Japanese were outflanking for all they were worth. Withdrawing

Australians were arriving hourly.

Peter Brune points out that the 39^th and 53^rd were ordered to provide

rear guard support at Eora Creek. Honner waited but the 53^rd did not

show up.Was this before or after being sent out of battle? There seems

to be contrary orders here. Go to Eora Creek. Go to Myola.

P209. Potts was never able to develop a firm base and was forced to

commit his brigade company by company as they arrived in an effort to

extricate the 39^th and 53^rd.

He was never able to regain the initiative…Another reason was the
weak patrolling particularly by the 53^rd who by half hearted reconnaissance
and fighting to secure the high ground on both flanks allowed the enemy to

secure high ground.

Allen stressed to Potts the need to send the 39^th back to Myola as
soon as possible to ease the supply situation and to get the 53^rd out
at an early date,

Major Cameron had been promoted and coming forward again to
assume command of the 53^rd.

P211. By morning of 31 August, the remnants of the 2/14^th were in
position about a mile south of Alola, brigade HQ had been set up
halfway between Alola and Eora Creek.

The 53^rd was sent out of battle and ordered to return to Myola.

So even Dudley McCarthy talks of weak patrolling particularly by
the 53^rd by half hearted reconnaissance and failing to secure high
ground on both sides. We have to seek reasons and not just judge.

That is a bit rough. Surely he has never been down and up the V
shaped gorge. Of course the 53^rd were half hearted. They had an
impossible job in which they could scarcely make a difference. Even
the 39^th was having massive problems and they were dug in. The 53^rd
were in the open and vulnerable.

P.200.From Alola, the track plunged down 1000 feet or more down a

bush covered, rugged 45 degree slope to the bed of Eora Ck. It crossed

a torrent by way of a slippery log bridge. Its way up the opposite side of

the great V of Eora Creek was closed in by bush. So steep that in places

a climber had to use his hands.

About 1500 feet above the creek, was Abuari waterfall where a mountain

stream plunged over a rock face.The track passed just in front of the fall
on slippery rock. On the other side of the fall, the track edged around a
wall of sheer rock.

Then we read of 70 men of the 53^rd going bush. Is that what they
did? We are only talking of a space of two days at the end of August
1942.

 P.204 With Buckley’s company of the 2/14^th, the rest of the 53^rd
except for about 70 men who had not reported in from patrol some
of whom were later found to have taken to the bush was in position
around Alola and patrolling to the left flank.

That may well be so. Are there reports of their actions? Were they
cut off by the Japanese? When the Militia HQ handed over to the
AIF HQ, the HQ troops retired down the track. How many soldiers
of the 53^rd went back as a defensive escort?

There seems no point for 53^rd soldiers to be wounded on the Abuari
side. They would lie unattended until death. Were there fuzzy wuzzy
angels on the Abuari side to whisk them down to Eora Creek field
hospital?

Peter Brune (P169) quoted Jack Sim as saying that at the Menari
parade, Honner said:

Some of the men here you feel let you down. [Honner was referring
to the 53^rd]. But they did not. Given different circumstances, they’d
be just the same as you. The fact their leaders may have failed them
and yours didn’t doesn’t mean they are any worse then you.

This statement reveals that there were soldiers of the 53^rd moving with

the 39^th. Honner was a great man and a great leader. But his original

decision to commit the 53^rd to patrolling meant that the die was cast.

The Abuari side was too big for an inexperienced militia battalion

that had also to patrol on the slopes above Alola. There is nothing

worse than fighting uphill. If the logistic situation was better, the

2/27^th may have been brought forward and made a difference.

P.199 There could be no question of sending forward the third

battalion of the 21^st Brigade until the supply situation was secure

to enable offensive operations.

The maladministration of supply undermined Potts’ position even

before he met his enemies with the effect of cabining and confining

all his activities in the forward areas. It changed his role from an

offensive to a defensive one. It denied him the use of the 2/27^th at

a crucial time.

So give the 53^rd a break. They were as much to blame as the crew

of the Titanic.