CAMERON COMMANDS 53RD BATTALION

This is the war record of the 53^rd Battalion taken from the book

South-West Pacific Area –First Year Kokoda to Wau by Dudley

McCarthy. Let this put to rest the myths about this untrained

battalion of young boys.

This book was kindly posted to Papua New Guinea by Rossco
Wilkinson past historian of the 2/14^th Association and son of a
soldier at Isurava. He may have sympathized floundering at this
end in the quest to find out what had really happened to the 53^rd.
The answer is quite routine and humane.

P.57. At start of March there came to the platoon at Salamaua a
little band lead by Captain A.G. Cameron. They were the 13 survivors
from the 2/22^nd battalion. Their leader was a ruthless and able soldier
who as a fugitive after the fall of Rabaul had been in touch with General
Morris’ HQ at Port Moresby.

P 130. Major Cameron who was appointed brigade –major of 30^th
Brigade after his return to Port Moresby from Salamaua was hurrying
to the front to take temporary command of Maroubra Force.

P.132. Cameron arrived to take command and they felt his vigour. They
were reinforced. All companies of the 39^th had total strength of 31 officers
and 433 men. There were 5 AIF officers and 3 NCOs and 35 natives of
the PIB and a small  group of ANGAU leaders with 14 native policemen.

Cameron’s plans for an attack on Kokoda where it was thought there
were 300-500 Japanese were well advanced.

P.133. Cameron sent Brewer and Captain Sorenson, with Sanopa and
another policeman to reconnoitre the track, along which he hoped to
send Symington’s company into assault.

P.134. Moving down main track, Dean’s men quickly ran into trouble.
They clashed sharply with a Japanese patrol. Though fought hard and
Cameron strengthened them with Headquarter Company men, they
made little progress. Cameron went forward to study the position
and discuss with Dean.

As they pressed on, Cameron realized his men could not advance so
he broke off the attack.

P.138. With the lull, Cameron decided to withdraw. When the main
body dug in at Isurava, they used bayonets, steel helmets and bully
beef tins as tools.

P141. On the same day as Rowell assumed command, Brigadier
Porter was ordered to move across the track to take command
of Maroubra Force to which a second of his battalions the 53^rd
had been allotted.

The first company of that Battalion had left Ilolo on the 11^th, another
was starting from Ilolo on the 12^th and the whole unit was expected
to arrive by the 20^th.

Before events had reached this stage, Lt Col Ralph Honner was
flown from Western Australia to command the 39^th Battalion. He
arrived at Isurava on 16 August and took over from Cameron at
once.

B Company of 53^rd marched into Alola on the same day and C
company was one days march behind. Honner knowing that
Porter was on his way, decided to keep the 53^rd intact for him
to employ as he would and use the 39^th to keep in touch  with
the Japanese.

He left the 53^rd companies at Alola with the Papuans to patrol
tracks east and west of the main Kokoda Track. converging on
Alola from Missima and Naro.

P.196. Headquarters 7^th Division had been established at Port
Moresby on the 18^th and Potts informed of supply difficulties.
He took over command of Maroubra Force on the 23^rd.

At once he sent Major Cameron to Divisional HQ to stress
supply needs. On same day, he ordered the 2/16^th forward to
Myola so as to have two battalions as far forward as possible.

P.198. On the 24^th, Rowell ordered Allen to withdraw the 39^th
as soon as possible to relieve the supply situation but undertake
no forward offensivemovement until the 30 days reserve had
been build up for him at Myola. Rowell added that only 300 of
the 800 carriers asked for by Potts could be spared.

There could be no question of sending forward a third battalion
of the 21^st Brigade until the supply situation was sufficiently secure
to enable offensive operations.

P.199. The maladministration of supply undermined Potts’ position
even before he met his enemies and had the effect of cabining and
confining all his activities in the forward areas. It changed his role
from an offensive to a defensive one. It denied him the use of the
2/27^th at a crucial time.

Potts considered three plans – leave the 53^rd and 39^th at Alola  
and Isurava and 2/14^th and 2/16^th at Myola until supply was
assured. 

To relieve worn out 39^th with an AIF battalion, leave the fresh 53^rd
in position, leave both militia battalions in position and deploy 2/14^th
and 2/16^th on high ground to  east and west. He rejected the plan
so as not to expose the exhausted 39^th.

He adopted the second –with the untried 53^rd as a pivot.

Brigadier Potts signaled Allen that he could not extricate the 39^th

from the forward areas without leaving 2/14^th dangerously alone.

The previous day, he told Allen that the 53^rd was so badly organized

that they could not be relied on to fight. He repeated his request for
the 2/27^th and said he would return the 39^th to Myola next day. He
stressed a need to send the 39^th back to Myola as soon as possible
to ease the supply problem.

P.200.From Alola, the track plunged down 1000 feet or more down
a bush covered, rugged 45 degree slope to Eora creek. It crossed a
torrent by way of a slippery log bridge. Its way up the opposite side
of the great V of Eora Creek was closed in by bush. So steep that in
places a climber had to use his hands.

About 1500 feet above the creek, was Abuari waterfall where a
mountain stream plunged over a rock face.The track passed just in
front of the fall on slippery rock. On the other side of the fall, the
track edged around a wall of sheer rock.

In accordance with the plan he had decided on, Potts proposed to
leave 53^rd role unchanged, to relieve the 39^th with the 2/14^th and
hold the 2/16^th in reserve.

P201. That morning, Potts signaled Allen that the relief of the 39^th by
2/14th had begun. He reported ‘condition of the 39^th men was weak
due to continuous work, lack of warm clothing, blankets, shelters,
curtailed rations, wet every night, monotonous diet combined with
a comparative static role.

Later in the day, he signaled that “ the 53^rd battalion training and
discipline was below standard required for action. Only useful
for holding objective aerodrome etc. For these reasons consider
it imperative that 2/27^th move to Myola as only fighting reserve.

P.202. In reply, Allen responsible for the defence of Port Moresby
from sea borne and airborne attack, referred to Japanese landings
at Milne Bay. Suggested that the relief of the 39^th be expedited.

P.204 With Buckley’s company of the 2/14^th, the rest of the 53^rd
except for about 70 men who had not reported in from patrol some
of whom were later found to have taken to the bush was in position
around Alola and patrolling to the left flank.

On the left, Honner’s battalion was holding at Isurava with 3 companies
of the 2/14^th. From the rear, 2/16^th was moving forward with Lieutenant
McGee’s A company at Eora Creek and Captain Sublet’s B company
following closely.

On 28^th, there was little action on the right flank although from Alola,
Japanese could be seen moving around Abuari. By 8.00am, 67 men of
Cairn’s and King’s company had regained touch with the 53^rd and were
in a position on the track to Abuari. By nightfall, McGee’s patrols had
entered Abuari without opposition.

P.205. On the 29^th, McGee was in contact by 9.00 am in vicinity of
Abuari trying to encircle a Japanese force of about 100. They seemed
to have at least two heavy machine guns, dug in and well protected.

Sublet asked that a company of 53^rd go around the waterfall to fall upon
the Japanese rear. Captain Kings company was sent. King reported he
was in a position to attack at dawn next morning.

P209. Potts was never able to develop a firm base and was forced to
commit his brigade company by company as they arrived in an effort
to extricate the 39^th and 53^rd.

He was never able to regain the initiative…Another reason weak
patrolling particularly by the 53^rd who by half hearted reconnaissance
and fighting to secure the high ground on both flanks allowed the enemy
to secure high ground.

Allen stressed to Potts the need to send the 39^th back to Myola as soon
as possible to ease the supply situation and to get the 53^rd out at an early

date,

Major Cameron had been promoted and coming forward again to
assume command of the 53^rd.

P211. By the morning of 31 August, the remnants of the 2/14^th were
in position about a mile south of Alola, the brigade HQ had been set
up halfway between Alola and Eora Creek.

 The 53^rd was sent out of battle and ordered to return to Myola.